United States–Saudi Arabia relations

United States–Saudi Arabia relations appear in Noam Chomsky’s account as a sharp test of whether Washington’s post-September 11 coalition diplomacy would make it more responsive to regional opinion. During Prince Abdullah’s visit to the United States, the Saudi prince pressed the Bush administration to take seriously Arab reactions to its strong support for Israeli repression. Chomsky recounts that the answer was not accommodation but a blunt assertion of U.S. power: the administration did not care what he or other Arabs thought. The episode links the bilateral relationship to the book’s wider themes of energy, military reach, and the limits of multilateralism.

A Strategic Relationship Under Pressure

Chomsky places the exchange against the strategic importance of the Gulf. The world’s principal energy reserves, he argues, are concentrated above all in Saudi Arabia and across the Gulf region, with substantial resources also in Central Asia. Afghanistan itself was a comparatively minor piece on this geopolitical board, but proposed pipelines through the country had long been discussed as a means of extending U.S. influence over Central Asian resources.

That setting gives the Saudi appeal particular weight. Prince Abdullah was not merely asking Washington to listen to criticism in the abstract: he was asking for attention to Arab responses to U.S. support for Israel at a moment when the administration was seeking international backing for its campaign. In Chomsky’s account, however, the region’s strategic value did not translate into meaningful influence over U.S. policy.

The Exchange During Prince Abdullah’s Visit

The prince’s request concerned the consequences of vigorous American support for Israeli violence and repression. A senior administration official reportedly answered that the United States was indifferent to what Abdullah or other Arabs thought. Chomsky also cites a senior official’s comparison of the current display of force with Operation Desert Storm: the official said the United States was acting with ten times the energy, so that Abdullah would understand what Afghanistan demonstrated about American capabilities. A former military official added that others would respect U.S. firmness and stop causing trouble.

The remarks turn a diplomatic encounter into an illustration of coercive signaling. Rather than treating Arab opinion as a constraint on policy, the officials presented military resolve as the means of commanding respect. Chomsky emphasizes that this posture had historical precedents, but argues that the post-September 11 setting gave it renewed force.

Coalition Diplomacy and Policy Continuity

The episode belongs to Chomsky’s broader critique of the sudden U.S. effort to assemble an international coalition. He traces the administration’s asserted freedom of action to an earlier formula, stated in 1993 under Bill Clinton: the United States would act multilaterally when possible but unilaterally when necessary. Madeleine Albright and Defense Secretary William Cohen reiterated the principle; Cohen described reliance on unilateral military power to defend vital interests, including access to essential markets, energy sources, and strategic resources.

Chomsky argues that George W. Bush went further, provoking concern among allies. The need for a coalition might temper official language, he suggests, but was unlikely to alter policy: partners were expected to provide support quietly and obediently, rather than participate in decisions. Washington, in his reading, continued to reserve the right to act as it chose while avoiding explicit reliance on international institutions. The response to Prince Abdullah thus exemplifies the gap between coalition-seeking and shared authority.

Energy, Bases, and the Projection of Power

Chomsky connects the administration’s posture to a widening military footprint. After the Afghanistan war, the United States established major bases in Central Asia for the first time, which he interprets as supporting U.S.-dominated multinational interests and control over regional resources. He situates these installations within a broader network directed toward the Gulf, extending from the Pacific to the Azores; before the war, Diego Garcia had been the network’s most secure base. The new Central Asian position, he argues, improved the capacity for intervention.

In this analysis, the conversation with Abdullah and the expansion of bases express related dimensions of power. The first makes clear that Arab objections to U.S. policy would not determine its course; the second strengthens the military means by which Washington could pursue its interests. Chomsky further suggests that the Afghanistan bombing may have been intended to warn other states about the consequences of defying U.S. rules, while carefully noting that this interpretation is an inference rather than a claim based on confidential documents.

A Relationship Framed by Unequal Influence

The account portrays Saudi Arabia as a strategically consequential state whose leader could raise regional objections but, in Chomsky’s telling, could not compel the United States to heed them. The exchange is therefore less a story of a negotiated change in policy than a demonstration of the limits of influence within an unequal partnership. The Gulf’s energy importance helps explain why the relationship mattered; the official remarks show how little that importance, by itself, guaranteed a hearing for Arab opinion.

Chomsky’s treatment also situates the episode within a larger pattern: U.S. officials presented military firmness as a source of respect, while the administration’s coalition effort left its freedom of action largely intact. United States–Saudi Arabia relations consequently serve as a case study in his argument that strategic interests and global military dominance could outweigh diplomatic appeals, even from a prominent regional partner.